World Trade after September 11, 2001: The U.S. Response by Glick, Leslie Alan
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 35
Issue 3 Winter 2002 Article 12
World Trade after September 11, 2001: The U.S.
Response
Leslie Alan Glick
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glick, Leslie Alan (2002) "World Trade after September 11, 2001: The U.S. Response," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 35: Iss.
3, Article 12.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol35/iss3/12
BERGER INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES LECTURE
World Trade after September 11, 2001:
The U.S. Responset
Leslie Alan Glick
Introduction ..................................................... 627
I. U .S. Custom s ............................................. 629
A. Short-term Impact of Destruction of U.S. Customs at 6
W orld Trade Center ................................... 629
B. The Effect of September Eleventh on Other Custom
Functions-The Bigger Picture ......................... 630
C. Compliance Programs ................................. 631
II. U.S. Coast Guard and the Movement of Goods by Water.. 635
III. Regulation of Trucking ................................... 636
IV. The United States Trade Representative's Office-
Countering Terror with Trade ............................. 637
C onclusion ...................................................... 638
Introduction
We were all affected by September Eleventh in different ways; some of us
more than others. Beyond the terror and destruction that ensued, the
attack on the World Trade Center evoked a symbolism of its own. It was
not simply an attack on the United States government and the American
people; it was an attack on the Port of New York and the World Trade
Center that symbolize New York City as a hub of world trade. In fact, the
terrorists have attacked the World Trade Center twice. September Eleventh
was their second attempt. Their first attempt to destroy the structure with
car bombs on February 26, 19931 was partially successful. These attacks
T Adapted from the text of a lecture delivered at Cornell Law School on April 12,
2002 as part of the Berger International Studies Lecture Series.
T Cornell University, B.S. (1967), J.D. (1970). Mr. Glick is former Chair of the
International Law Section of the Federal Bar Association and is author of several books,
including GUIDE TO UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND TRADE LAWS AFTER THE CUSTOMS
MODERNIZATION ACT (Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 1997) and GUIDE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 1994).
1. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Explosion at the Twin Towers: Car Bombs; A Tool of Foreign
Terror, Little Known in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at 24.
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indicate that stopping the ability of New York City and consequently the
U.S. to function as a trade and commercial center was clearly part of the
terrorist mission.
Thus, as a trade lawyer, the events of 9/11 have had a double impact
on me; both the shock and despair shared by millions of other Americans,
but also an attack on my profession and the government agencies that I
deal with on a daily basis. My focus today will be on how the events of 9/
11 have affected commercial trade from an importer's viewpoint. I will
focus on the U.S. Customs Service because it is the primary government
agency regulating imports. I will also focus on two branches of the Depart-
ment of Transportation: the United States Coast Guard that regulates ship-
ping into the ports and harbors of the United States and the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration that has jurisdiction over trucking.
After looking at the measures the U.S. has adopted in response to ter-
rorism, I will discuss the "diplomatic initiative" by U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Robert Zoellick to use U.S. trade policy as a way of combating
conditions that might foster terrorism. While other branches of govern-
ment were reciting the rhetoric of war and revenge against the "Axis of
Evil," the U.S. Trade Representative-part of the Executive Office of the
President-was planning to reach out to Arab countries through free trade
agreements.
Initially, it is essential to understand that as part of different govern-
mental departments, the activities of the Customs Service, the Coast
Guard, the Federal Highway Motor Vehicle Carrier Safety Administration,
and the U.S. Trade Representative, are not necessarily coordinated. 2 In
addition to these departments, many government agencies are involved in
aspects of international trade regulation; including the Department of
Commerce International Trade Administration, the Department of Agricul-
ture, the Department of State, and the independent bipartisan U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission. Each department has a role in either enforcing
or administering trade policy, and they frequently disagree. Often, they do
not even coordinate their activities, so within the course of this discussion
if it seems that the different agencies were pursuing different and inconsis-
tent goals, it is because they were. 3 Consequently, the United States has
often been accused of having no coherent trade policy.
The events of September 11, 2001 unveiled a new form of weapon;
passenger aircrafts used as bombs. This use of an ordinary vehicle of
transportation as a weapon of destruction prompted a new frame of
thought, one in which we must consider that terrorists can transform
2. At the time of the lecture, the Customs Service was part of the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Coast Guard and Federal Highway Motor Vehicle Carrier Safety Administra-
tion, were parts of the Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Trade Representative,
was part of the executive office of the President. The first two agencies are now part of
the new Department of Homeland Security.
3. This lecture was given prior to the establishment of the Department of Home-
land Security. This agency was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.
107-296. (Nov. 25, 2002)
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loaded vessels-such as Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC) or trucks-into
deadly weapons. Therefore, the government agencies mentioned above
have a new agenda-to stop articles of commerce from becoming weapons
of mass destruction.
I. U.S. Customs
U.S. Customs Service is the principal agency responsible for policing inter-
national trade activities, and was at the center of the September Eleventh
attack. It was also one of the agencies that has reacted the fastest with new
procedures for handling international trade transactions. Seven-hundred
ninety employees from the New York Region worked in the U.S. Customs
Office that was located in 6 World Trade Center, a building that was not
directly hit by the planes, but was destroyed by falling debris when the twin
towers disintegrated. Miraculously, all of the employees escaped. How-
ever, the New York Seaport-one of the busiest seaports in the world-was
for all practical purposes out of business for two weeks because the office's
telecommunication capabilities were destroyed. This two-week hiatus
affected the entire trade community, even importers and exporters that do
not use the port of New York.
A. Short-term Impact of Destruction of U.S. Customs at 6 World Trade
Center
The events of September Eleventh had both short-term and long-term
effects on Customs. The short-term effects were the practical disruptions
to normal activities that occurred because, in part, Customs itself was both
a target and a victim of the attack. The long-term effects were the security
changes relating to the movement of goods into the United States. I will
first briefly discuss some of the short-term effects because these have had,
and will continue to have, an impact on the trade community for some
time.
Although Customs headquarters is in Washington D.C., the New York
Seaport office traditionally handled many important Customs functions.
One such function is the issuing of rulings on the classification of imports,
under one of thousands of tariff numbers under the Harmonized Tariff
System-a difficult task handled by National Commodity Specialists
(NCS). Customs has import specialists at almost every port of entry to do
this job informally; however, in New York, the NCSs are experts and pro-
vide guidance to the import specialists in all the other ports, who may not
see enough examples of a product to develop their own expertise.
The NCSs also have other specialized duties. First, "requests for inter-
nal advice" are frequently used when an importer challenges a ruling as to
classification or valuation of a past or on-going transaction. These are filed
at the port of entry but then generally sent to the NCS in New York for
review. Second, the NCSs are the important figures in issuing binding
Customs Rulings on prospective transactions. Although these ruling
requests are some times addressed to Customs Headquarters, they often
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are referred initially to the NCS in New York. They aim to issue a ruling
within thirty days, which they meet often more in theory than in practice.
The events of September Eleventh had several effects on the function-
ing of Customs Rulings and the role of the NCSs because all of them are in
New York. An immediate impact of September Eleventh was to disrupt the
binding Customs Rulings program. First, all documents at 6 World Trade
Center were destroyed. Therefore, ruling requests and samples that had
previously been submitted were also destroyed. This meant importers and
their attorneys had to re-file or resubmit documentation and samples, and
that the ruling requests and the period for a ruling were delayed.
Due to the disruption caused by the tragedy, their lack of records,
offices, and phones, Customs initially suspended the entire binding ruling
program. Consequently, it was impossible for an importer or its attorney
to obtain a binding ruling on the classification or valuation of an imported
product during this time. This alone had a serious impact on the trade
community creating uncertainty and as a result affecting exports to the
U.S. Fortunately, the binding rulings program was reinstated on Novem-
ber 30, 2001. There was a substantial backlog from the period of suspen-
sion. Customs had set a goal of eliminating its backlog by September 30,
2002.4
Since September Eleventh, Customs has developed new rules on the
submission samples. For example, samples of chemical or powdered sub-
stances can no longer be submitted with a. ruling request. If a ruling
involves a product of this nature, special arrangements must be made with
the NCSs.
The events of September Eleventh also affected the filing of entry docu-,
ments in New York. Many functions regarding the filing of entry docu-
ments and protests of Customs at the port of New York were initially
transferred to U.S. Customs in the ports of Newark and JFK. This transfer
included reports of dutiable vessel repairs that were made abroad. Entering
textile products requiring visas created delays in presenting the original
documents issued by foreign governments. Therefore, Customs adopted
special procedures to allow copies of the visas to be produced if the origi-
nals could not be delivered at the time of entry.
B. The Effect of September Eleventh on Other Customs Functions-The
Bigger Picture
The above discussion focused on the impact on Customs functions based
in New York, but, of course, the impact of 9/11 is much greater. Immedi-
ately after 9/11, Customs was on a Level 1 Alert. Level 1 Alert is the high-
est level of vigilance short of closing the borders. There are four levels of
alert; each has a different effect on Customs operations. During Level 4
Alert, or Code Green, U.S. Customs operates normally without specific
threat advisories. During Level 3, or Code Blue, U.S. Customs operates at
4. This goal has been met. See Customs News October 17, 2002. http://
www.customs.ustreas.gov/news/news/htm.
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normal operations with heightened awareness. At Level 2, or Code Yellow,
Customs functions at an increased level of security. Finally, at Level 1, or
Code Red, Customs undertakes intensive anti-terrorism operations. 5
Prior to September Eleventh, U.S. Customs was on Level 4 Alert. This
was immediately changed to Level 1 Alert, which meant: intensive primary
inspections, more importers designated for secondary inspections, more
delays at border crossings, more inspections of merchandise-generally,
only two percent of all merchandise is ever inspected, and more use of
electronic equipment for x-ray and bomb detection to check cargoes con-
sidered suspicious or high risk. Delay times at the Mexican and Canadian
borders are posted twice daily on a web site.6
Like airline delays due to more security, importers now must learn to
live with more delays in the entry of goods. In Customs, much of the addi-
tional security measures will be achieved through selective inspections,
adding more personnel in the inspection and control division, and using
dogs to screen shipments for explosives, drugs, and currency. Customs
will also conduct a greater number of random searches of both persons
and articles.
Customs is the only agency authorized to search-without a search
warrant-people, cargo, and conveyances that cross the border. This ple-
nary power is based on an old Supreme Court case holding that Constitu-
tional rights begin after a person enters the country, rather than at the
border. 7 Customs is trying to make its inspections non-intrusive by
detecting abnormalities in the movement of cargo and by using high-tech
equipment, such as machines capable of scanning entire containers. Over
50,000 containers arrive in the United States each day. Customs must rely
more on technology and intelligence, because it simply does not have the
manpower to inspect more than a small percentage of the cargo without
bringing commerce to a standstill.
C. Compliance Programs
Customs traditionally, like its sister agency the Internal Revenue Service,
relies on voluntary compliance because it only has the capacity to check a
small percentage of transactions. This voluntary compliance was institu-
tionalized in the Customs Modernization Act of 1995;8 commonly known
as the "Mod Act." The Act created certain obligations on the part of the
importer to use "informed compliance" and "reasonable care." Before the
act, the importer's sole obligation was to describe his or her merchandise
5. See Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner's Message, Threat Response Plan (Feb.
15, 2000), at http: / / www. customs. ustreas. gov/ xp/ cgov/ newsroom/ commissioner/
messages/archives/feb152000.xml.
6. See generally Border Wait Times, at http://nemo.customs.gov/pr6cess/border-
times/bordertimes.asp.
7. See Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8. Title VI, North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified as scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). For a complete
discussion of the "Mod Act," see LESLIE ALAN GLICK, GUIDE TO UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
AND TRADE LAWS AFTER THE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION ACT (1997).
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honestly. The importer was not required to have any knowledge of cus-
toms laws or procedures and could solely rely on his customs broker.
The Mod Act changed this by imposing obligations on the importer
either to know the law and procedures, or to find them out with the help of
experts. In response to these new obligations, importers began to develop
compliance programs and handbooks. I work regularly with importers to
develop such programs. Customs rewards importers that use compliance
programs because these programs enable Customs to perform its duties
more efficiently.
Traditionally, compliance programs have emphasized commercial
issues, such as correct tariff classifications, valuations, marking of goods,
record keeping, etc. However, now compliance programs have taken on a
new meaning in terms of a partnership with Customs in insuring the
security of merchandise in the warehouse, in transportation, and in fight-
ing terrorism. I have helped many companies write compliance hand-
books. Recently, I began sending them an insert emphasizing the issues
that are now on the forefront of Customs lists. Customs checks compli-
ance through various types of audits. Previously these were known as
"CAT," which is an acronym for "compliance assessment teams." A CAT
would visit selected importers and conduct compliance assessment
reviews, resulting in penalties for those found in non-compliance.
More recently, Customs developed a program known as "focused
assessment," which is a type of compliance audit based on risk manage-
ment principals. "Focused assessment" was developed before September
Eleventh, but is now being modified to include audits of security compli-
ance procedures as well as commercial issues such as classification, valua-
tion, marking, and record keeping. The first part of focused assessment is
to evaluate a company's internal controls over customs operations. As long
Customs is convinced that internal controls are adequate, companies that
have compliance programs with a "chain of command" responsible for cus-
toms issues as well as checks and balances in place to insure customs com-
pliance will not receive full scale audits. Companies that do not have
compliance programs will be subject to assessment compliance testing,
which is a form of audit that could involve repeated Customs visits over the
course of a year or longer.
One of the cornerstones of this new emphasis on cooperation and
compliance of the trade community in the area of security is the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism or C-TPAT program.9 The purpose of
the program is to develop industry-wide security for countering terrorism.
Standards are much like ISO 9000 programs for quality production. This
program is still new and evolving, but some of its basic concepts are
described below.
First, the C-TPAT program involves increased security at the plant and
loading dock. Customs inspects goods only when they enter. However,
9. See generally Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), at http://
www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial-enforcement/ctpat/.
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goods often are vulnerable to tampering when they are in the loading dock
or at the plant. Among other steps, C-TPAT recommends increased use of
cameras, better background checks of employees, more security guards,
and use of fences and security procedures for identifying visitors.
Goods are also vulnerable during transportation, because explosives
or parts of weapons can be added to shipments. In the past, this has been
quite common with drugs. For example, trucks carrying large amount of
goods from Mexico that enter through the ports of Laredo and El Paso
became prime targets for drug smugglers to introduce contraband into the
trucks in the tires, frames, inside packing, etc. I recently had a case involv-
ing a U.S. client with a plant in Juarez, Mexico, whose truck was stopped
and seized at the Customs inspection station because dogs detected drugs.
Customs found nine million dollars worth of marijuana hidden between
boxes of legitimate goods. My client was shocked, its truck and goods were
confiscated by Customs. We undertook a thorough review and discovered
that the truck had taken four hours to go from the plant to the border,
which is typically a forty-five minute trip. The driver, who worked for an
outside contractor, had stopped to allow the contraband to be added to the
truck. My client, although not implicated in any crime, had not even sealed
the truck. As part of its effort to avoid a penalty from Customs, my client
agreed to implement a rigid compliance program. Part of its compliance
program involves keeping a careful log of the times trucks arrive and leave
the plant, and remaining in constant radio contact with the dispatcher so
the location of trucks can be determined at any time so that suspicious
delays can be spotted immediately and customs notified.
Although the following example involved drug smuggling, terrorists
might use the same methods to introduce explosives or weapons of mass
destruction into trucks. Customs cannot inspect every truck, so it is look-
ing to work with the trade community to increase enforcement. Among the
measures discussed in the C-TPAT program are methods of sealing trailers
and crates, including high-tech methods with electronic seals that emit a
radio signal when opened. Trucks and containers can also be tracked
through global positioning satellites (GPS). However, these high-tech mea-
sures are expensive, so Customs is recommending measures that are less
difficult to implement such as employee background checks and photo
identification cards. In the example above, my client could not have dis-
covered whether its employees had a criminal record, because it could not
have obtained this information from the Mexican government. Access to
information is changing and there are higher expectations for U.S. compa-
nies with plants overseas and more cooperation is expected from the for-
eign governments involved.
The C-TPAT group is the next generation of existing groups such as
the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, known as BASC. 10 BASC has
10. See generally Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), at http://www.customs.
gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial enforcement/international-programs/partnerships/
basc.xml.
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existed for a number of years, and its purpose is to help businesses work
with Customs to develop better ways of detecting and preventing smuggling
of drugs and contraband. BASC still exists but the C-TPAT group has taken
a much higher priority.
Customs uses a carrot-and-stick approach to get companies to partici-
pate in the C-TPAT program. Companies participating in the program are
assured expedited processing, priority service, advance notice of Customs
compliance and enforcement exams, dedicated commercial "fast-lanes" for
approved and active participants, less intrusive inspections to avoid delays
in opening and repacking crates and containers, a designated Customs liai-
son, and assistance in securing cargo and conveyances against the threat of
terrorism. In contrast, companies that do not want to participate will be
subject to designation as "unknown category," a higher scrutiny of cargo
and conveyance, increased reviews and audits, added examinations,
increased "requests for information," and longer processing times. Thus,
although C-TPAT is a voluntary program-as are all Customs compliance
programs-it is clear that the rewards of participation are significant and
the consequences of non-participation are costly.
Customs is also looking forward to additional help from customs bro-
kers and freight forwarders, including verifying physical quantities of
goods and more accurate invoice descriptions that make verification of a
shipment's contents easier. Customs is hoping to use brokers and freight
forwarders as an early warning system. If the country of the goods' origin
does not square with the type of goods involved (e.g., bananas from Ice-
land), the freight forwarder or broker is expected to alert Customs. For-
warders and brokers are also expected to alert Customs when customers
display undue concern about Customs inspections or change delivery
addresses. For example, if for the past three years a company has shipped
two containers a week from Sri Lanka to San Francisco, and this week an
additional container was booked and two days prior to sailing the destina-
tion of one container is changed, then Customs might consider this a "red
alert" situation because of the increase in the container count and the
change of destination. In this situation, the broker or freight forwarder
would have a duty to report the information to Customs.
Although everyone would agree that segments of the trade community
should cooperate by reporting suspicious information to Customs, this
may create an adversarial relationship between the importer and exporter
and customs broker and freight forwarder. The reality of a post-September
Eleventh trade environment is that there may be less trust and a more dis-
tant relationship between the shipper, the forwarder, the customs broker,
accountants and consulting firms, and the importer than there has been in
the past. Fortunately, attorney-client privilege still protects importers'
communications and documents with their customs attorney.
Customs is also placing more emphasis on importers' knowledge of
their customers and vendors. One large importer, Target Stores, uses an
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"Approved for Purchase"" (AFP) program where it collects information
from potential suppliers such as factory size, capacities, number of employ-
ees and the names and addresses of the facilities they might subcontract
with, including the names of other principals and owners of each factory.
Target validates this information during compliance inspections. Although
this process may not be feasible for smaller companies, it is an indication
of the lengths that some companies are willing to go in order to ensure the
integrity of their suppliers, and thus the shipments and goods. Customs
might come to expect similar standards in the years to come.
As part of its security efforts, Customs has established a program
known as "Operation Shield America."'12 Under this program, Customs
urges private firms to inform Customs if they are approached for suspi-
cious purchases that might assist in the creation of weapons of mass
destruction.
Customs also wishes to minimize the security risks flowing from the
availability of information about the destination and means of transit for
shipments. Currently, the amount of paper created in connection with
international shipments is immense. Bills of lading, commercial invoices,
and other documents, which provide information about the shipment and
means of carriage, are available to third parties. There are multiple copies
of many of these forms and the shear volume of critical shipment informa-
tion that is distributed to third parties often compromises their security.
Customs and other agencies are studying the security implications of the
availability of these documents to third parties, in attempts to reduce the
distribution of shipping documents. Customs is considering replacing the
paper forms with secure electronic data transmission or encoded chips
that are installed in the cargo and container.
II. U.S. Coast Guard and the Movement of Goods by Water
The Coast Guard has traditionally been a stepchild of the law enforcement
agencies. Ninety-five percent of all foreign trade moves by vessels and
ships, which are growing larger. Between 1960-70, the average container
ship was about 1,700 twenty foot container equivalent units (TEU). By
2000, the average container ship had grown to 4,848 TEUs. Thus, the aver-
age ship coming into port has almost four times as much cargo as it did
thirty or forty years ago. In 2000, sixty-two percent of new ship orders for
container ships were so-called mega-ships with capacity of 5,000 TEUs or
above.
At the same time, Coast Guard manpower is about 35,000, which is
approximately the same size as the size of the New York City police force.
Its fleet is the third oldest among the forty-one nations that maintain a
11. See generally Target Corporation, General Information, http://www.targetcorp.
com/targetcorp-group/about/vendor.jhtml.
12. See generally Press Release, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Customs Launches
"Operation Shield America": New Initiative Seeks to Prevent Terrorist Organizations
From Acquiring Sensitive U.S. Technology, Weapons, and Equipment, at http://www.
customs.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2001/1210-O1 .htm.
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coast guard. The Coast Guard is now faced with new challenges. Its priori-
ties have shifted from search, rescue, and drug interdiction to anti-terror-
ism activities. To meet this challenge, it has called-up 8,000 reservists,
borrowed patrol boats from the Navy, and increased the deployment time
of its vessels at sea.
These changes have practical effects for commercial shippers. The
time for advance notice to the Coast Guard for arrival of vessels has been
increased from twenty-four hours to ninety-six hours. Further, a ship may
not enter the harbor until it is inspected and its crew questioned. The
Coast Guard is boarding more vessels and is escorting ships with poten-
tially dangerous cargo.
Like Customs, the Coast Guard is working with the trade community.
It has formed "Harbor Safety Committees" to work out plans for harbor
safety. The main security concern is large vessels-such as cruse liners,
large petroleum crude carriers, and product carriers-that can be potential
targets or weapons. Small boats can also be used to carry explosives, as
was the case of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen. 13 The Coast Guard
has a huge task to carry out with limited resources. There is no doubt that
the trade community will bear some of the cost of the Coast Guard's
expanded duties in the form of higher port fees and longer transit times.
The costs to shipping companies will invariably be passed on to the
importers.
Seaport Security has become an important part of homeland defense.
Recently, the Senate passed S.1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of
200114 that covers such areas as local port security committees, maritime
facility security plans, employment investigations, mandatory advanced
electronic information for cargo and passengers arriving by vessel to name
a few. Its counterpart in the House of Representatives is H.R.3437,15
which was introduced by Congressman Clay Shaw.
III. Regulation of Trucking
Like ships, trucks are both potential targets and weapons. As weapons,
trucks can be used to attack buildings, as in the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing.' 6 Trucks containing weapons or nuclear materials become potential
targets of hijacking. In conjunction with Section 1012 of the Patriot Act, 17
the Department of Transportation (DOT) is in the process of developing a
rulemaking procedure to prohibit states from issuing or renewing commer-
cial drivers' licenses with an endorsement to operate a motor vehicle trans-
13. See, e.g., Days of Rage in the Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000 at A2.
14. Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, S. 1214, 107th Cong. (2001).
15. Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, H.R. 3437, 107th Cong. (2001).
16. See, e.g., Joe Haberstroh, et al., Killer Blast in Midwest; Many Children Among the
Dead in Explosion at Federal Building, NEWSDAY, April 20, 1995 at 3; CNN report at
www.cnn.com/US/OKC/index.html.
17. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56.
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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porting hazardous materials until the Department of Justice has conducted
a background check on the applicant. Currently, there is no DOT require-
ment for employment or background checks, most states require only a
written exam to obtain a commercial drivers license. Other efforts are
being taken to prevent the hijacking or use of runaway trucks as weapons.
These efforts involve the employment of various technologies such as
brakes that can be remotely activated and GPS.
IV. The United States Trade Representative's Office-Countering
Terror with Trade
The U.S. Trade Representative is part of the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent and is the chief official that conducts trade negotiations and repre-
sents the United States in the World Trade Organization in Geneva.
Shortly after September Eleventh, the current U.S. Trade Representative,
Robert Zoellick, indicated that economic growth through trade is the best
weapon against terrorism. Zoellick focused on Congress as needing to
complete action on the U.S. free trade agreement with Jordan-the first
such commitment with a country in the Middle East, excluding Israel. 18
He also noted that Congress needs to complete authorization for a trade
accord with Vietnam, a former foe that in Zoellick's words is "recognizing
that its future depends on markets, not Marxism." Zoellick also called on
Congress to reauthorize critical expired trade preference legislation for
Andean countries.
Most importantly, Representative Zollick called on Congress to enact
the so-called Trade Promotion Authority that he feels that America needs to
negotiate new trade agreements such as the Free Trade Agreement for the
Americas. The Trade Promotion Authority is a new euphemism for what,
under the Clinton Administration was called "fast-track" and voted down
by Congress. Recently, administration trade officials again zealously
sought fast-track or Trade Promotion Authority to authorize them to negoti-
ate trade agreements and restrict the power of Congress to change them
afterwards, limiting Congress to a yes or no vote. The administration offi-
cials believe that fast-track authority is needed because other countries will
not negotiate seriously if the United States cannot promise that a proposed
agreement will not be changed.
However, some members of Congress see giving the administration
these broad negotiating powers as a serious derogation of their Constitu-
tional powers to approve treaties and of their oversight powers over Execu-
tive branch trade policies. Congress is in effect writing a blank check to
the Administration by giving them the power to negotiate agreements that
Congress will not change. These concerns are sometimes addressed
through side agreements as was recently accomplished when the House
approved Trade Promotion Authority after the President made certain com-
18. Since the date of this lecture, a Free Trade Agreement Act between the U.S. and
Morocco has also been proposed. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act,
107 Pub. L. 43, 115 Stat. 243 (2001).
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mitments to congressmen from textile producing states that certain textile
products would not be subject to tariff preferences. 19
U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick believes building a coalition that
will help overcome poverty and other conditions that lead to alienation and
despair are as important to fighting terrorism as is placing more inspectors
with guns at border crossings. According to Zoellick, the United States is
in danger of losing its moral leadership in world trade and economic devel-
opment. Zoellick points out that the United States is a party to only two of
one-hundred thirty multilateral free-trade agreements and only a party to
one of thirty free trade agreements that exist in the Western Hemisphere.
Conclusion
The events of September Eleventh have permanently changed the interna-
tional trade environment. In the future there will be more of a burden on
importers and shippers to develop security plans to ensure the integrity of
their goods and shipments. Compliance programs will be emphasized and
those participating will be rewarded. Those not participating will find it
more difficult and time-consuming to import merchandise. Customs will
conduct more risk-based focused assessments to determine the extent of
compliance by importers, and those that are not in compliance will be
penalized. Companies should be preparing compliance programs includ-
ing both commercial compliance issues and security related issues. They
also should develop compliance handbooks that include security proce-
dures and conduct self-audits to determine their compliance levels and
take corrective action before Customs comes calling.
From a policy viewpoint, it is unclear whether internationalist views
of people like U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick will prevail over narrower,
more xenophobic and insular views promoted by other government agen-
cies. Although it is unclear which viewpoint is correct, what is clear is that
world trade after September Eleventh will be much different than it has
been in the past.
19. The Trade Promotion Legislation was passed by Congress on August 1, 2002.
The Trade Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. 210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
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